Reflections on The Islamic Legitimacy of the Muslim Uprisings

As revolutions and recordings to the Middle East Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and elsewhere, everywhere most Muslims energy through a wave of hope in a region that has suffered the stamping supremacy of the “Presidents of Life” . Yet, a few Muslims are more wicked and see the waves of protests as unregistered uprisings against legal leaders.
To begin the analysis of the current situation in the Middle East and North Africa, each of the movements in the different countries affected must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The conditions in each country are unique and therefore a general statement is probably not just wrong, but also irresponsible. What follows are a few considerations that would have part of any significant discussion of the Islamic legitimacy of the various movements that may be cultivated the political map of the Middle East. Visit:-

First of all, we must keep in mind that classic treaties and writings dealing with Muslim political theory will not give us the answer to the question of Islamic legitimacy of the ongoing uprisings in the Muslim world. This is because the writings took place in a socio-political environment that differs completely from the current one. Particularly meaningful in this regard is the advent of the modern nation and the accompanying concepts of state allocation, legitimacy, loyalty, citizenship, social contract and national interest. Each of these concepts differs in the modern environment of its previous conceptual counterpart, or was unknown in the premodern world. Therefore, the writings of premodern Muslim academics, regardless of how brilliant, we can not have a complete vision of social, political and cultural problems with which Muslims are currently doing. Secondly, the nature of the neocolonial agreements that prevail in many Muslim nation states, where a “buyer bourgeoisie” “reaches” indigenous masses on behalf of a foreign force, the legitimacy of the legitimacy of the state makes a controversial point. In other words, if the state is merely a foreigner control, and the policy they pursue aims to serve the interests of a foreign elite, in the first place, it does not make sense to discuss the loyalty that people owed to the state without asking a deeper question.

Namely, if truly loyalty to the state is a kind of de facto loyalty to non-Muslim foreign power, how can loyalty questions any definite meaning or relevance of an Islamic perspective?
A third important issue is the hegemonic nature of modern state and its ability to exercise control over the lives of its citizens in an unimaginable way at the time when medieval Muslim political theorists are writing. In general, modern state controls the economic life possibilities of its citizens, defines the parameters of political participation, controls the extent and nature of education, can almost be instituted in the private life of its citizens, can determine the conditions of mass confinement (ie, the Japanese hospitalization law, or the war of current medicine in the United States), and if you choose, citizenship may suppress impunity, as by definition, the state the legal use of the force in Society monopolizes.

The result of the previous section is that the extensive scope of the modern Muslim state requires an enlarged base to define loyalty and legitimacy. In previous times, when the lack of technology and security technology limited the scope of state power, it was of course to limit the extent of state investment to questions around religious problems. However, the deep size of the state requires legitimacy and loyalty examinations to consider issues such as economic security, political participation and basic human dignity along with related issues. If these problems motivate Muslims who challenge the legitimacy and effectiveness of their statements, they must be considered by academics and religious authorities who evaluate the suitability of these challenges. In addition, by accepting the legitimacy of the sovereign state, we implicitly accept that all citizens share an inherent equality. This is the case, the state is not in possession of an individual or an oligarchy or any other elite.

On the contrary, it is in possession of people. It is such, if people rise in response to state abuse, the upliftment by definition cannot be considered illegal. An example given by the Hannah Arendt political theoretical notice can be mentioned here to explain this idea. We cannot consider an angry mafia that owns a bank to be similar to a severe group of students who hold a building on the campus of a public university. The first group is engaged in private property, while the second “own” of the University as MUC

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